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Abstract 26 
In many areas of the world, recreational fisheries are not managed sustainably. 27 
This might be related to the omission or oversimplification of angler behaviour and 28 
angler heterogeneity in fisheries-management models. We present an integrated 29 
bioeconomic modelling approach to examine how differing assumptions about angler 30 
behaviour, angler preferences, and composition of the angler population alter 31 
predictions about optimal recreational-fisheries management, where optimal 32 
regulations were determined by maximizing aggregated angler utility. We report four 33 
main results. First, accounting for dynamic angler behaviour changed predictions 34 
about optimal angling regulations. Second, optimal input and output regulations 35 
varied substantially among different angler types. Third, the composition of the angler 36 
population in terms of angler types was important for determining optimal 37 
regulations. Fourth, the welfare measure used to quantify aggregated utility altered the 38 
predicted optimal regulations, highlighting the importance of choosing welfare 39 
measures that closely reflect management objectives. A further key finding was that 40 
socially optimal angling regulations resulted in biologically sustainability fish 41 
populations. Managers can use the novel integrated modelling framework introduced 42 
here to account, quantitatively and transparently, for the diversity and complexity of 43 
angler behavior when determining regulations that maximize social welfare and 44 
ensure biological sustainability. 45 
 46 
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Introduction 51 
Recreational anglers are the dominant users of most freshwater and some 52 
coastal fish stocks in industrialized countries (Arlinghaus and Cooke 2009). 53 
Accordingly, managers are faced with the challenge of balancing the interests of 54 
angling groups utilizing fisheries resources with concerns about the biological 55 
sustainability of exploited fish populations (Radomski et al. 2001; Peterson and Evans 56 
2003; Arlinghaus 2006b). The lack of sustainable recreational-fisheries management 57 
in some areas of the world (Post et al. 2002; Lewin et al. 2006) suggests that current 58 
management strategies have not always been successful in achieving this balance. 59 
This may be because effectively managing a fishery requires understanding not only 60 
how fish respond to exploitation, but also how anglers alter their fishing behaviour in 61 
response to social and ecological changes in the fishery; consequently such 62 
behavioural dynamics must be incorporated into integrated fisheries-management 63 
models (Johnson and Carpenter 1994; Radomski et al. 2001; Post et al. 2008). In the 64 
past, however, recreational-fisheries researchers and managers have focused on the 65 
biological dimension of recreational fisheries, largely overlooking the “human 66 
dimension” (Aas and Ditton 1998; Cox and Walters 2002a; Arlinghaus et al. 2008a). 67 
To move forward, it is critical to quantify and integrate angler preferences and 68 
resulting behavioural decisions into recreational-fisheries models designed to 69 
determine optimal management policies (Radomski and Goeman 1996; Arlinghaus et 70 
al. 2008a). 71 
Optimum social yield (OSY) is one management objective that can 72 
incorporate social and economic aspects into fisheries-management models and 73 
policies (Roedel 1975). In comparison with the traditional approach of managing for 74 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in both commercial and recreational fisheries 75 
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(Larkin 1977; Malvestuto and Hudgins 1996; Hilborn 2007), OSY is better suited to 76 
recreational fisheries because it incorporates socio-cultural benefits a fishery provides 77 
that are not measured by yield alone, such as an angler’s satisfaction resulting from 78 
catching a large fish (Roedel 1975; Malvestuto and Hudgins 1996; Radomski et al. 79 
2001). OSY integrates such social and economic factors with biological 80 
considerations, to develop a fisheries-management objective that maximizes the total 81 
utility (alternatively termed benefits or social welfare; Dorow et al. 2010) that a 82 
recreational fishery provides to society (Roedel 1975; Malvestuto and Hudgins 1996). 83 
Hence, similar to MSY, management for OSY may provide an unambiguous 84 
management objective against which to judge management developments and 85 
successes (Bennett et al. 1978; Barber and Taylor 1990; Radomski et al. 2001). 86 
Despite the general advantages of a socioeconomic objective such as OSY 87 
over MSY for managing recreational fisheries, few recreational-fishing models based 88 
on utility theory have been developed to predict the optimal social welfare generated 89 
by different management schemes (e.g., Die et al. 1988; Jacobson 1996; Massey et al. 90 
2006). Furthermore, angler-effort dynamics, if considered at all, are generally 91 
assumed to be predominantly or exclusively driven by catch rates, or by some other 92 
measure of fish abundance (Johnson and Carpenter 1994; Beard et al. 2003; Post et al. 93 
2003). However, angler behaviour is likely much more complex (Carpenter and Brock 94 
2004; Arlinghaus et al. 2008a). It is known from social-science research on 95 
recreational fisheries that, in addition to catch rates, a diverse set of social and 96 
biological attributes of a fishery – such as availability of preferred species, fish size, 97 
congestion, facilities, regulations and the perceived aesthetic value of the fishery – 98 
affect the participation decisions of anglers (reviewed in Hunt 2005). Therefore, 99 
angler-effort dynamics driven by catch rates alone can be unrealistic (Paulrud and 100 
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Laitila 2004). Hence, recreational-fisheries models designed to maximize angler 101 
utility should account for complexity in angler behaviour by incorporating multi-102 
attribute utility functions that describe the fishing-participation decisions of anglers. 103 
Another important, yet often overlooked, aspect of recreational fisheries is 104 
angler diversity (i.e., heterogeneity in angler behaviour; Anderson 1993; Jacobson 105 
1996; Post et al. 2008). Various types of anglers will differ not only in their fishing 106 
preferences, and therefore in the utility they derive from fishing (Fisher 1997; 107 
Connelly et al. 2001; Arlinghaus et al. 2008b), but also with respect to their fishing 108 
practices (Bryan 1977; McConnell and Sutinen 1979; Hahn 1991). Hence, the 109 
potential impacts of fishing on fish populations likely vary with angler type (Dorow et 110 
al. 2010). For example, in many fisheries a minority of anglers catches the majority of 111 
fish (Baccante 1995), and this minority typically encompasses the most avid and 112 
specialized angler types (Dorow et al. 2010). Human-dimension researchers have 113 
repeatedly highlighted that accounting for angler diversity is important for sustainable 114 
fisheries management (Fisher 1997; Aas et al. 2000; Arlinghaus and Mehner 2003). 115 
While there are some examples of coupled social-ecological models that link complex 116 
angler behaviour and fish population dynamics (e.g., Cole and Ward 1994; Woodward 117 
and Griffin 2003; Massey et al. 2006), to our knowledge only McConnell and Sutinen 118 
(1979) and Anderson (1993) considered heterogeneity either in angler preferences or 119 
fishing practices in a bioeconomic modelling context. In both cases, the modelling 120 
frameworks differed substantially from that presented here. In particular, these earlier 121 
studies did not use random-utility models to predict angler participation under 122 
different management scenarios, and the complexity of the biological and angler-123 
behaviour components were much more simplified. 124 
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Our goals of this study are fourfold. First, we present an integrative 125 
bioeconomic modelling approach that links the ecological, socioeconomic and 126 
management components driving angler-effort dynamics to a fish population model, 127 
and that allowed optimal harvest regulations for various angler types to be predicted. 128 
Second, we demonstrate the importance of assumptions about angler-effort dynamics 129 
in fisheries management by contrasting predictions from models that make traditional 130 
assumptions of static or exclusively catch-based dynamic angler behaviour with 131 
models that assume more complex, multi-attribute dynamic behaviour. In this study, 132 
complexity in angler behaviour is characterized by whether angler-effort dynamics 133 
rely on a single fishery attribute to drive angler behaviour or on multiple fishery 134 
attributes. Third, by incorporating heterogeneity in angler behaviour into a 135 
bioeconomic modelling framework by accounting for the perceived utility a fishery 136 
provides to an angler population,, we examine how angler diversity (i.e., 137 
heterogeneity of angler types) and the composition of the angler population (in terms 138 
of these angler types) influence predictions about optimal management strategies. 139 
Finally, we explore how different management objectives, represented by different 140 
measures of social welfare, alter predicted optimal management regulations. Rather 141 
than simulating a particular fishery, our approach is stylized in nature and is intended 142 
to demonstrate the suitability of an integrated bioeconomic modelling approach for 143 
investigating coupled angler-fish population dynamics. 144 
Methods 145 
We developed an integrated model in which angler-type-specific utility 146 
derived from both catch- and non-catch-related attributes of the fishing experience 147 
was linked to a deterministic age-structured fish population model for a single-148 
species, single-lake fishery. Our modelling framework had three components: (i) a 149 
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management component that described the regulations applied to the fishery system, 150 
(ii) a socioeconomic component that described the effort dynamics of different angler 151 
types, and (iii) a biological component that described the fish population dynamics. 152 
Angler utility was used to determine changes in angling effort in the dynamic angler-153 
behaviour scenarios, and to make predictions about optimal harvest regulations. The 154 
resulting impacts on the fish population under different management policies were 155 
investigated to determine whether management for social optima also conserved the 156 
fish population. All model equations are summarized in Table 1 and illustrated in 157 
Figure 1; model parameters are listed in Tables 2 and 3. 158 
Management component 159 
Traditional harvest-control measures have focused on regulating the harvest 160 
rates of individual anglers to achieve biological sustainability (Radomski et al. 2001). 161 
However, in open-access systems, which are typical for many recreational fisheries 162 
(Post et al. 2002), output-control measures that do not directly limit angler numbers 163 
cannot constrain total fishing mortality (Radomski et al. 2001; Cox and Walters 164 
2002a; Cox and Walters 2002b). The failure of traditional output-control measures to 165 
preserve some recreationally exploited fish populations (Post et al. 2002) has led to a 166 
call for input-control measures that more directly limit angling effort (Cox and 167 
Walters 2002a; Cox and Walters 2002b). Therefore, we investigated two types of 168 
regulatory policies over a range of values (Table 2): a traditional output-control 169 
regulation, expressed in terms of a minimum-size limit, and an input-control 170 
regulation, expressed in terms of the number of angling licenses issued. 171 
Socioeconomic component 172 
Angler utility 173 
Insert  
Figure 1 
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Economic utility theory assumes that human agents make choices that will 174 
maximize their personal utility (alternatively termed benefits or satisfaction; Perman 175 
et al. 2003). For example, from a set of potential alternatives, recreational anglers will 176 
choose to fish a fishery that provides them with the greatest possible utility (Hunt 177 
2005). Multiple attributes contribute to an individual angler’s utility function, and the 178 
relative importance of fishery attributes (such as fish size or crowding), called part-179 
worth utilities, for total angler utility vary substantially among different angler types 180 
(Aas et al. 2000; Oh et al. 2005a; Oh and Ditton 2006). Choice models based on 181 
random-utility theory (McFadden 1974; Manski 1977) can be calibrated with actual 182 
(revealed) or hypothetical (stated) empirical site-choice data. Such models constitute 183 
one approach that can be used to predict recreational-angler behavior, which can then 184 
be used to predict and understand how anglers will react to changes in the attributes of 185 
a fishery (Paulrud and Laitila 2004; Massey et al. 2006; Wallmo and Gentner 2008). 186 
Three scenarios of angler behaviour were investigated. In the first scenario, we 187 
simulated static angler behaviour, characterized by anglers that did not respond to 188 
changes in a fishery’s attributes (such as fish size, catch rate or congestion level), but 189 
instead, participated at the maximum effort level allowed. Predictive recreational-190 
fisheries models often assume constant exploitation rates and ignore angler dynamics 191 
when evaluating regulation impacts (e.g., Dunning et al. 1982). The static scenario 192 
mimics this situation by keeping angling effort constant. In our two other scenarios, 193 
anglers were allowed to behave dynamically, i.e., they chose to fish or not to fish 194 
depending on the time-varying utility provided by the fishery. Utility functions that 195 
described the preferences of a particular angler type for the fishing attributes 196 
experienced were used to simulate angler-type-specific behavioural decisions. In the 197 
second scenario, the utility of fishing was based on the utility gained from catch rates 198 
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alone (Table 1, equation 1a; and Table 3), an approach used in previous recreational-199 
fishing models (Cox et al. 2003; Post et al. 2003). In the third scenario, utility was 200 
based on a more realistic multi-attribute utility function (Table 1, equation 1b; and 201 
Table 3). Attributes included in this utility function were catch rates, average size of 202 
fish caught, maximum size of fish caught, angler congestion, minimum-size limit 203 
regulations and license costs, all of which have been shown to affect anglers’ fishing 204 
decisions about participating in a particular fishery (Hunt 2005). Although the multi-205 
attribute utility function was not used to determine angling effort in the static 206 
scenario, for comparative purposes it was used to evaluate the quality of the fishery at 207 
the end of the simulations (Table 1, equation 1b) (Figure 1). 208 
Angler-effort dynamics 209 
In our second and third scenarios, anglers responded dynamically to their 210 
perception of fishery quality by changing the amount of effort they devoted to the 211 
fishery. In these scenarios, the utility gained from a fishing experience determined the 212 
angler’s probability of an angler choosing to fish over the alternative of not fishing 213 
(Table 1, equation 2a). This probability was calculated as is typical in empirical 214 
choice models (Oh et al. 2005b; Massey et al. 2006). The probability of fishing based 215 
on angler utility, as well as the maximum time anglers would fish in a year 216 
irrespective of fishing quality, were then used to determine realized annual effort of 217 
anglers (i.e., the amount of time they actually fished; Table 1, equations 2b-2e; Figure 218 
1). To account for the fact that anglers make decisions based on previous experiences 219 
and habits, and not exclusively based on their most recent experiences (Adamowicz et 220 
al. 1994), a fishing-behaviour persistence term (Table 2) was introduced to the effort 221 
dynamics (Table 1, equation 2b). This term described the relative influence of last 222 
year’s realized fishing probability on the current year’s realized fishing probability. 223 
Insert  
Table 1 
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We assumed that the realized annual angling effort (Table 1, equation 2e) was limited 224 
by three factors: the realized probability of fishing, the desired maximum effort that 225 
an individual angler would fish irrespective of angling quality (Table 1, equation 2c), 226 
and the input-control measure expressed in terms of the number of angling licenses 227 
issued (Table 1, equation 2d). The instantaneous fishing effort of a given angler type 228 
was assumed to be constant throughout the fishing season, and to equal zero after the 229 
fishing season ended (Table 1, equation 2f). 230 
Angler heterogeneity 231 
Angler heterogeneity was introduced into our model by defining three 232 
different angler types – generic, consumptive, and trophy anglers – that differed in 233 
their degree of angling specialization (Bryan 1977; Ditton et al. 1992; Table 3). Our 234 
parameterization of angler behaviour was based on recreational specialization theory 235 
(Bryan 1977; Ditton et al. 1992). Bryan (1977) described four general angler types 236 
ranging from the casually involved to the technique- and setting-specialist. As 237 
specialization levels increase, skill levels improve, fish size is of greater importance, 238 
and harvesting fish is of lesser importance (Bryan 1977). This can lead to differing 239 
propensities to perform voluntary catch-and-release (Arlinghaus 2007), and to an 240 
increased ability to catch more and larger fish (Dorow et al. 2010). Angler preferences 241 
also change with specialization: for example the value of solitude relative to the social 242 
aspects of the fishing experience varies with specialization (Ditton et al. 1992; 243 
Connelly et al. 2001). Based on pioneering work by Bryan (1977) and subsequent 244 
applications and refinements (e.g., Quinn 1992; Allen and Miranda 1996; Fisher 245 
1997) we devised qualitatively realistic angler-type-specific part-worth-utility 246 
functions for the various attributes of the fishing experience. Figure 2 illustrates 247 
Insert  
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qualitative differences in preferences and tolerances for different fishery attributes 248 
among angler types, while Figure 3 illustrates the resultant utility functions. 249 
Parameters for three stylized angler types were chosen to reflect differential 250 
skill, consumptive orientation and overall dedication to the recreational fishing 251 
experience (Table 3). Angler types differed in both their fishing practices, and their 252 
preferences for various attributes of the fishing experience (Figure 2; Table 3). 253 
Generic anglers were assumed to be the least specialized, consumptive anglers were 254 
intermediate, and trophy anglers were the most specialized. By definition, 255 
consumptive anglers had the greatest consumptive orientation. Accordingly, generic 256 
anglers were assumed to (i) be least likely to participate in angling activities, (ii) be 257 
intermediate in their tolerance of restrictive minimum-size limits, (iii) be the most 258 
affected by license costs, (iv) have an intermediate interest in catch rates and be least 259 
interested in the challenge of catching fish, (v) be least interested in average fish size 260 
and be intermediately interested in trophy-sized fish, (vi) be most tolerant of angler 261 
crowding, (vii) be least skilled, and to (viii) practice some voluntary catch-and-release 262 
of harvestable fish (Table 3). In contrast, consumptive anglers were assumed to (i) 263 
participate at an intermediate level in angling activities, (ii) be least tolerant of 264 
restrictive minimum-size limits, (iii) be intermediately affected by license costs, (iv) 265 
be most interested in catch rates and intermediately interested in the challenge of 266 
catching fish, (v) be intermediately interested in average fish size and least interested 267 
in trophy-sized fish, (vi) be intermediately tolerant of angler crowding, (vii) have 268 
intermediate skills, and (viii) practice no voluntary catch-and-release of harvestable 269 
fish (Table 3). Finally, trophy anglers were assumed to (i) participate the most in 270 
angling activities, (ii) be most tolerant of restrictive minimum-size limits, (iii) be least 271 
affected by license costs, (iv) be least interested in catch rates but most interested in 272 
Insert  
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the challenge of catching fish, (v) be most interested in average fish size and trophy-273 
sized fish, (vi) be least tolerant of angler crowding, (vii) have the greatest skills, and 274 
(viii) practice the most voluntary catch-and-release of harvestable fish (Table 3). 275 
Trophy anglers were also assumed to target larger fish relative to consumptive and 276 
generic anglers (through the use of different fishing gear; Rapp et al. 2008; Table 3). 277 
Parameter values and further justification for these assumptions are outlined in Table 278 
3, and the resulting shapes of the angler-type-specific part-worth-utility functions are 279 
illustrated in Figure 3. Although these functions might look different for particular 280 
fisheries, we believe that their general features adequately reflect the angling 281 
behaviour and preferences of differently specialized recreational anglers. 282 
The importance of angler heterogeneity for determining optimal fishing 283 
regulations was examined by first comparing model results among different 284 
homogeneous angler populations, each composed of a single angler type. However, 285 
because natural angler populations are likely comprised of a mixture of angler types, 286 
we also considered a mixed angler population composed of all three angler types 287 
mentioned above. As this aspect increases the model complexity and in an attempt to 288 
simplify angler descriptions, recreational-fisheries researchers and managers may 289 
wish to simplify angler descriptions by assuming some form of average angler 290 
behaviour (Hahn 1991; Aas and Ditton 1998). Therefore, to examine the importance 291 
of explicitly accounting for the composition of the angler population on model 292 
predictions of optimal regulations, we compare model results for an average angler 293 
type population with those for a corresponding mixed angler population composed of 294 
three angler types. here, the average angler type was defined by a weighted average of 295 
fishing preferences and fishing practices of the three angler types according to their 296 
relative frequencies in the mixed angler population (Table 2). It should be noted, that 297 
Insert  
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this is a weighted average and therefore depends on the assumptions about the relative 298 
abundance of angler types in the mixed angler population. However, this example 299 
demonstrates the implications of the simplifying assumption of an average angler. 300 
Biological component 301 
Our study aimed to show how the biological and socioeconomic and 302 
management components of recreational-fishery systems could be linked in an 303 
integrated modelling framework. For brevity we therefore only describe the essentials 304 
of the biological component in terms of growth, reproduction and survival 305 
functions.Tables 1 and 2 provide further details about equations and parameters.. 306 
In short, an age-structured model was used to describe the fish population 307 
being exploited. Individual fish within an age class were assumed to be ecologically 308 
equivalent (Tables 1, equations 3a and 3b). The fish population model was 309 
parameterized to be representative of a northern pike (Esox lucius L.) population. We 310 
chose this species due to its importance for recreational fisheries in both North 311 
America and Eurasia (Paukert et al. 2001; Arlinghaus and Mehner 2004a). In all 312 
scenarios, the fish population reached its demographic equilibrium prior to the 313 
introduction of fishing, and the results presented correspond to equilibrium conditions 314 
after fishing was introduced (i.e., we investigated long-term dynamics). 315 
The determination of fishing effort (Table 1, equations 2a-2f) and fish 316 
reproduction (Table 1, equations 5a-5d) were assumed to occur on an annual basis at 317 
the beginning of each year, and population and fishery characteristics were updated 318 
annually. However, because recreational fishing is often a size-selective process 319 
(Lewin et al. 2006) occurring throughout the year, we described fish mortality and the 320 
growth in body size of fish by continuous functions (Table 1, equations 4a-4e). This 321 
allowed our model to account for fish to grow into vulnerable size classes within each 322 
 14
year, and for the recapture and repeated exposure to hooking mortality of released 323 
individuals throughout the fishing season, both of which are important aspects of 324 
recreational fisheries (Coggins et al. 2007). These resultant ordinary differential 325 
equations were solved numerically using the ODE45 function in Matlab (version 7.0.1 326 
Mathworks, Inc.). 327 
Two crucial density-dependent relationships were included to allow for 328 
compensatory responses of the fish population to exploitation (Lorenzen and Enberg 329 
2002): density-dependent biphasic growth in body size (Table 1, equations 4a-4d) 330 
(Lester et al. 2004; Dunlop et al. 2007) and density-dependent survival from spawning 331 
to post-hatch of fish of age zero. The latter was represented by a Beverton-Holt type 332 
relationship, which was assumed to apply at the beginning of each year (Table 1, 333 
equations 5c) (Lorenzen 2008). Fish younger than one year were assumed to 334 
experience no further natural mortality (Table 2) but could experience fishing 335 
mortality if they became large enough. Fish one year and older experienced a constant 336 
natural mortality rate in addition to size-dependent fishing mortality (Table 2, 337 
equation 7h). 338 
Fishing mortality was assumed to be size-dependent in two ways that 339 
quantitatively differed among angler types (see Table 3 for angler specific 340 
parameters). First, catch rates were dependent on the size-dependent vulnerability of 341 
fish to the specific fishing gear utilized by each angler type. Vulnerability to capture 342 
therefore differed among age classes and also changed over the course of the growing 343 
season (Table 1, equations 7a and 7b; see Table 3 for parameters). Catch rates were 344 
also dependent on fishing effort and the skill level of the anglers (Table 1, equation 345 
7b, see Table 3 for parameters). Second, harvest of fish was regulated by a minimum-346 
size limit ( MSL ;Table 1, equation 7c). While all fish above the legal MSL  were 347 
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harvestable, a portion of undersized fish were also considered harvestable because of 348 
non-compliance with regulations (either through ignorance or choice; Sullivan 2002). 349 
Anglers chose to harvest fish based on their catch rates mediated by their propensity 350 
to voluntarily release fish (Table 1, equation 7e) determined by the personal limit an 351 
angler had on the number of fish they harvested in a day; (see Table 3 for angler-type-352 
specific parameters). Released fish were assumed to experience hooking mortality 353 
from handling or injuries (Table 1, equation 7f; Table 3; Arlinghaus et al. 2007, 354 
Arlinghaus et al. 2008c). Fish under the legal size limit, which were not part of the 355 
pool of illegally harvestable fish, only experienced hooking mortality (Table 1, 356 
equation 7g). 357 
After fishing was introduced, the fish population was allowed to equilibrate. 358 
The spawning potential ratio ( SPR ) was used to assess the biological impacts of 359 
angling exploitation. SPR , which has previously been used in recreational-fishing 360 
models (Coggins et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2009), measures reductions in the fish 361 
stock’s reproductive output, and can thus serve as an indicator of recruitment 362 
overfishing (Goodyear 1993; Coggins et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2009). In our model, we 363 
use a weighted SPR  (Table 1, equation s 5b and 6). Depending on the life history of a 364 
species, values below 0.2-0.3 are considered critically low (Goodyear 1993) and it is 365 
commonly assumed that SPR  should be maintained above 0.35-0.40 to reduce the 366 
risk of recruitment failure (Goodyear 1993; Coggins et al. 2007). We used these 367 
values as criterion to assess the risk of recruitment overfishing under different 368 
management policies. 369 
Social-welfare measures 370 
Social welfare was used to determine optimal regulations. Social welfare is an 371 
aggregation of individual utilities (Perman et al. 2003) and determines the total 372 
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economic value of a good or service, such as a recreational-fishing experience, as 373 
perceived by anglers (Edwards 1991). A social welfare function describes how 374 
individual utilities are aggregated based on their social “worth”, and it is assumed that 375 
any concerns about equity are accounted for in the aggregation method (Perman et al. 376 
2003). However, maximizing social welfare does not necessarily result in an equitable 377 
distribution of resources among individuals, nor is there universal consensus on what 378 
constitutes an appropriate social-welfare measure or function (Perman et al. 2003). 379 
Managers must therefore carefully decide what social-welfare measures reflect their 380 
management objectives (e.g., maximizing angler satisfaction and/or participation). 381 
In most model simulations described below, a utilitarian social-welfare 382 
function was used, referred to as total utility (TU), in which individual utilities were 383 
weighted equally among angler types. However, in a subset of simulations, three 384 
different social welfare functions, representing different management objectives, were 385 
used to examine how these differences alter predictions about socially optimal 386 
management regulations. The first welfare measure, TU, described the utility gained 387 
by an angler type per fishing experience, multiplied by the total annual number of 388 
fishing experiences (measured in terms of angling effort, and expressed in angling 389 
days) by that angler type, and summed over all angler types (Table 1, equation 8a; 390 
similar to McConnell and Sutinen 1979). TU reflects the realized demand for angling 391 
experiences. However, TU may be influenced heavily by individuals with 392 
disproportionately large utility, and a more equitable distribution of resources among 393 
all anglers in the angler population may be desired (Loomis and Ditton 1993). Thus, a 394 
second, more equitable utilitarian social-welfare function (EU) was examined. Here, 395 
individual utility from a fishing experience was weighted by the relative abundance of 396 
angler types in the angler population, to create a weighted mean utility for an 397 
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individual, which was then multiplied by the aggregate number of angling days (Table 398 
1, equation 8b). Finally, we examined a Rawlsian approach (RU) to utility 399 
maximization, where the utility of the worst-off individual was maximized, 400 
emphasizing the objective of achieving the most equitable distribution of resources 401 
(Perman et al. 2003). Here, the utility from the angler type with the lowest individual 402 
utility was used and multiplied by the aggregate number of angling days (Table 1, 403 
equation 8c). Naturally, the second and third social-welfare measures only differed 404 
from the first measure in the mixed angler population composed of different angler 405 
types. 406 
Outline of analysis 407 
Across a range of minimum-size limits and angling-license numbers, three 408 
different angler-behaviour scenarios – static, catch-based dynamic and multi-attribute 409 
dynamic scenarios – were considered for five different types of angler populations – 410 
generic, consumptive, trophy, average, and mixed. Optimal input and output 411 
regulations were identified by maximizing one of three measures of social welfare – 412 
total utility TU, equitable utilitarian utility EU, and Rawlsian utility RU (Table 1, 413 
equations 8a-c). With this approach, we examined the impacts of dynamic angler 414 
behaviour, angler heterogeneity, and composition of the angler population on socially 415 
optimal regulations and the resulting biological impacts on the fish population. In 416 
most analyses presented, TU was used to determine socially optimal management 417 
regulations. However, we also examined the EU and RU social-welfare measures in 418 
the context of multi-attribute dynamic angler behavior and mixed angler populations, 419 
to demonstrate how different management objectives alter socially optimal 420 
management regulations. 421 
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We used sensitivity analyses to explore the importance of different attributes 422 
for determining angler behaviour, optimal regulations and biological impacts, by 423 
removing in turn each attribute from the multi-attribute angler-behaviour scenario. 424 
However, given the hypothetical nature of the constructed angler types and their part-425 
worth-utility functions (Figure 3), we decided it would be imprudent to derive 426 
generalized conclusions about the relative importance of individual attributes in 427 
determining optimal regulations. Therefore, sensitivity analyses were not intensified 428 
beyond the approach summarized above. 429 
Results 430 
Impacts of dynamic angler behaviour 431 
A comparison of the three angler-behaviour scenarios showed substantial 432 
differences in predictions of total utility (left to right in Figure 4). Optimal minimum-433 
size limits were predicted to be highest in scenarios with catch-based dynamic angler 434 
behaviour and were generally lower (and similar) for corresponding scenarios with 435 
static and multi-attribute dynamic angler behavior for angler populations composed of 436 
one angler type (Table 4; Figure 4). Optimal effort regulations were lowest in the 437 
static scenarios, intermediate in the multi-attribute scenarios, and highest in the catch-438 
based scenarios (Table 4). In fact, optimal license numbers in the catch-based 439 
scenarios were often more than two times larger than the number predicted in the 440 
other scenarios. Under predicted optimal regulations, the number of hours that anglers 441 
actually fished, termed realized angling effort, were identical in the static and multi-442 
attribute scenarios when the angling population was composed of one angler type, 443 
(thus following the pattern of predictions for optimal minimum-size limits). In the 444 
catch-based scenario, realized effort followed a trend similar to that of optimal license 445 
numbers. 446 
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The risk of recruitment overfishing and the biological impacts of recreational 447 
angling on the modelled pike population were affected by the type of angler 448 
behaviour considered (Figure 5). Static angler behaviour caused the most negative 449 
impacts on the fish population across the range of minimum-size limits and license 450 
numbers examined, compared to the two scenarios in which anglers behaved 451 
dynamically. This was because realized angling effort in the static angler-behavior 452 
scenario was fixed at the maximum level allowed, whereas in the two dynamic 453 
scenarios realized angling effort was less and depended on the utility anglers gained 454 
from the fishery. When comparing the two dynamic scenarios, biological impacts of 455 
fishing at low to moderate MSL  levels in the catch-based scenario were generally less 456 
severe than in the multi-attribute scenario, with the latter approaching recruitment 457 
overfishing and fishery collapse at lower license numbers. At high MSL  levels, 458 
approaching complete catch-and-release conditions, the risk of recruitment 459 
overfishing was often greater in the catch-based scenario, although the SPR  never 460 
dropped below 0.4, even when a large number of licenses were issued. 461 
Impacts of angler heterogeneity 462 
Not only angler dynamics, but also angler heterogeneity substantially affected 463 
model-predicted optimal input and output regulations. When the three angler types 464 
were compared (first three rows in Figure 4), optimal minimum-size limits were 465 
generally intermediate for generic anglers, low for consumptive anglers and high for 466 
trophy anglers, with the latter approaching complete catch-and-release conditions, 467 
except in the catch-based scenario, in which complete catch-and-release regulations 468 
were preferred by all angler types (Figure 4; Table 4). Optimal effort regulations were 469 
found to be the lowest for consumptive anglers in the static and multi-attribute 470 
scenarios, intermediate for trophy anglers and highest for generic anglers. However, 471 
Insert  
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in the catch-based scenario, all angler types preferred a large number of licenses, with 472 
generic anglers favouring somewhat fewer angler licenses than the other angler types. 473 
Under optimal regulations, consumptive anglers were predicted to fish the least, but 474 
generic and trophy anglers invested more (and similar) realized angling efforts in the 475 
static and multi-attribute scenarios (Table 4). However, in the catch-based scenario, 476 
consumptive anglers invested the most realized angling effort. At their optimum, 477 
trophy anglers, as a homogeneous group, derived the highest utility from fishing, 478 
exceeding that of the other anglers types by a factor of more than two; generic anglers 479 
were intermediate, while consumptive anglers derived the least utility in the static and 480 
multi-attribute scenarios (Figure 4). 481 
Differences among the angler types also affected the risk of recruitment 482 
overfishing. In all scenarios and across all regulation combinations, consumptive 483 
anglers generally had the most negative impact and generic anglers the least, except in 484 
the multi-attribute scenario at high MSL  levels. This trend was also seen when 485 
examining the biological impacts of different angler types under the different 486 
regulations they perceived as optimal (Table 4). Under these optimal regulations, the 487 
biological impact of consumptive anglers was greatest, occurring close to the 488 
threshold levels of recruitment overfishing (0.35-0.40) and at regulation combinations 489 
for which small changes in regulations could cause large changes in the risk of 490 
recruitment overfishing (Figure 5). At these respective optima, generic and trophy 491 
anglers impacted the fish population much less than consumptive anglers and at 492 
regulation combination that imply a low risk of recruitment overfishing. 493 
We found the sensitivity of results to individual attributes in the multi-attribute 494 
scenario varied in their effect on optimal regulations, realized effort and SPR , and 495 
varied greatly with angler type, without any consistent pattern becoming evident 496 
 21
(Table A1). We could tentatively conclude, however, that findings for trophy anglers 497 
were strongly dependent on crowding aversion, while findings for consumptive 498 
anglers were particularly sensitive to MSL  levels and some catch attributes. It was 499 
also interesting to notice that the response of mixed angler populations to the removal 500 
of a particular fishery attribute sometimes exceeded that of homogeneous angler 501 
populations, highlighting the importance of including heterogeneity in angler 502 
preferences (Table A1). 503 
Impacts of angler-population composition 504 
Predictions of optimal input and output regulations substantially differed 505 
between the average angler and the mixed angler population (bottom two rows in 506 
Figure 4). Under optimal regulations, license numbers and realized angling efforts 507 
were higher for the mixed angler population than for the average angler population 508 
(Table 4). Optimal MSL  levels for the mixed angler population were the same as the 509 
average angler population in the static scenario, lower in the catch-based scenario and 510 
higher in the multi-attribute scenario. In addition, across all scenarios, TU under 511 
optimal regulations was greater in the mixed angler population than in the average 512 
angler population. 513 
For the average angler population was assumed, minimum-size limits and 514 
realized efforts under optimal regulations were identical in the static and multi-515 
attribute scenarios. However, for the mixed angler population, minimum-size limits, 516 
license numbers and realized efforts under optimal regulations were substantially 517 
higher in the multi-attribute scenario than in the static scenario (Figure 4; Table 4). 518 
Furthermore, in the multi-attribute scenario, predictions of optimal license sales and 519 
realized efforts were generally higher than in any of the three homogeneous angler 520 
populations (Table 4). The mixed angler population was also predicted to have a 521 
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greater biological impact than the average angler population (Figure 5). However, 522 
under optimal regulations, the risk of recruitment overfishing in both cases was low 523 
(Table 4). 524 
Changes in the composition of the mixed angler population that fished in the 525 
multi-attribute scenario were described by the changes in the proportion total realized 526 
angling effort invested by each angler type (Figure 6). This shows that the 527 
composition of the angling population varied depending on minimum-size limits and 528 
license regulations, with trends predominantly following changes in MSL  (Figure 6). 529 
At low MSL  levels and low license numbers, all angler types fished in approximately 530 
equal proportions, whereas at low MSL  levels and high license numbers the 531 
composition of the angling population resembled that of the entire angler population 532 
(i.e., 40% generic, 30% consumptive and 30% trophy). At moderate to high MSL  533 
levels the majority of consumptive anglers in the angler population chose not to fish, 534 
and thus dropped out of the angling population. Even higher MSL  levels resulted in 535 
generic anglers dropping out too, and thus in an angling population dominated by 536 
trophy anglers. Under optimal regulations, the composition of the angling population 537 
in the multi-attribute scenario was heavily skewed toward generic and trophy anglers, 538 
with few consumptive anglers being attracted to the fishery (Table 4; Figure 6). 539 
Impacts of social-welfare measures 540 
In the multi-attribute scenario for the mixed angler population, socially 541 
optimal minimum-size limits were highest for total utility (TU), intermediate for 542 
equitable utilitarian utility (EU) and lowest for Rawlsian utility (RU) (Figure 7; Table 543 
4). Optimal license numbers were also highest for the TU social-welfare measure, but 544 
lower (and similar) for the EU and the RU social-welfare measures, and realized 545 
angling efforts under optimal conditions showed the same pattern. 546 
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Under optimal regulations, optimal license numbers and realized angling 547 
efforts for the average angler population never exceeded those for the mixed angler 548 
population, irrespective of the applied social-welfare measure (Table 4). However, the 549 
optimal MSL  was slightly higher in the average angler population than in the mixed 550 
population when a RU social-welfare measure was applied (Table 4). Under optimal 551 
regulations, SPR  levels were well above 0.40, irrespective of the applied social-552 
welfare measure (Table 4); therefore, all social-welfare measures avoided recruitment 553 
overfishing under optimal regulations. 554 
Discussion 555 
We developed a bioeconomic modelling approach that integrates angler 556 
behaviour and angler heterogeneity with age-structured and density-dependent fish 557 
population dynamics, to determine socially optimal input and output regulations for a 558 
recreational fishery. Using this approach, we have demonstrated how angler 559 
behaviour and heterogeneity affect optimal regulations, and how optimal regulations 560 
varied with the social-welfare measure applied. 561 
Angler behaviour 562 
The importance of accounting for angler behaviour was demonstrated by the 563 
differences observed in predicted optimal regulations (expressed in terms of 564 
minimum-size limits and license numbers) among three angler-behavior scenarios that 565 
describe, respectively, static, catch-based dynamic and multi-attribute angling 566 
dynamics. Predicted optimal minimum-size limits and license numbers were 567 
substantially higher for the catch-based scenario than for the other two scenarios. 568 
However, most published recreational-fisheries models that incorporated dynamic 569 
angler behaviour assumed that anglers respond to catch rates alone or some measure 570 
of fish abundance (Johnson and Carpenter 1994; Beard et al. 2003; Post et al. 2003), 571 
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thus neglecting other attributes known to affect participation decisions of anglers 572 
(Hunt 2005). 573 
Our findings call into question the validity of this simplifying assumption and 574 
resulting predictions of “optimal” regulations. For example, when catch rate was 575 
assumed to be the only attribute determining the fishing decisions of anglers, the 576 
catch-based scenario predicted optimal input and output regulations that effectively 577 
imply complete catch-and-release regulatory policies at largely unlimited effort levels. 578 
This prediction is clearly misleading in many situations and results from an 579 
oversimplification of angler preferences. Indeed, because some angler types are 580 
strongly harvest-oriented, management conflicts and dilemmas have occurred in some 581 
recreational fisheries despite high catch rates, when the possibility for anglers to 582 
harvest was constrained (Matlock et al. 1988; Radomski 2003; Sullivan 2003). 583 
Perceived harvest constraints may result in the displacement of harvest-oriented 584 
anglers to alternative fisheries (Radomski and Goeman 1996; Beard et al. 2003), an 585 
important effect that cannot be captured by models that assume angler behaviour to be 586 
driven by catch rates alone. In contrast, our investigations of multi-attribute dynamic 587 
angler behaviour, presumably allowing a more realistic representation of angling 588 
effort, showed that complete catch-and-release regulations were not always socially 589 
optimal. 590 
Our sensitivity analyses highlighted that, while most attributes of the fishing 591 
experience (such as fish size, catch rate, crowding, aversion to regulations, etc.) were 592 
important for determining angler choice and angler welfare, their relative importance 593 
varied among angler types (Table A1). This underscores the importance of including 594 
all relevant catch- and non-catch-related attributes affecting angler choice in 595 
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bioeconomic fisheries models to more accurately predict angler behaviour and fishing 596 
pressure, and to derive optimal regulations that maximize angler welfare. 597 
A multi-attribute perspective on angler behavior and welfare is also likely to 598 
improve predictions of the biological impacts of fishing under different regulations. 599 
Historically, angler populations were expected to be self-regulating, as anglers were 600 
assumed to leave a fishery when catch rates declined (Cox and Walters 2002a, 601 
Radomski 2003). However, because catch rate is just one among many attributes 602 
characterizing a fishing experience, such catch-based self-regulation does not 603 
necessarily apply (Post et al. 2002; Paulrud and Laitila 2004; Post et al. 2008). Indeed, 604 
we found that realized angling effort and the biological impacts were higher in the 605 
multi-attribute scenario than in the catch-based scenario at low to intermediate MSL  606 
levels. These finding corroborate claims that multi-attribute angler behaviour may put 607 
fish populations at risk of overexploitation (Post et al. 2002), since anglers continue to 608 
be attracted to particular fisheries even after catch rates have declined because other 609 
attributes of the fishery (such as close proximity, social aspects of the experience) 610 
provide them with utility, and thereby partly compensate for reduced catch rates. The 611 
interesting features of the multi-attribute utility scenario derive from its partial 612 
“decoupling” of fish and angler dynamics (Johnson and Carpenter 1994). In contrast, 613 
the catch-based scenario is appropriate for describing predator-prey interactions 614 
where a predator’s fitness is predominantly dependent on prey consumption. Not 615 
accounting for the array of attributes that attract anglers to a fishery may therefore 616 
lead to an underestimation of the biological impacts of fishing (Post et al. 2002). 617 
Consequently, management decisions based on assumptions of purely catch-based 618 
angler behaviour will likely be less conservative than intended with regard to limiting 619 
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biological impacts, and probably also less successful than intended with regard to 620 
angler satisfaction and participation. 621 
Angler heterogeneity 622 
Our results have shown that accounting for the complexity of angler behaviour 623 
when predicting the amount of angling effort invested in a particularly fishery can 624 
fundamentally improve predictions about optimal regulations. However, this 625 
improvement alone might not be enough: predictions are likely even more realistic 626 
when the heterogeneity of angler behaviour is considered in recreational-fisheries 627 
models. 628 
We found that, because of the consumptive orientation and aversion to angling 629 
regulations of some angler types, minimum-size limits were particularly important in 630 
determining angler utility and optimal regulations. Under less restrictive output 631 
regulations, consumptive angling effort was reduced, because the fish population 632 
could not support large numbers of harvest-oriented anglers while at the same time 633 
maintain high catch rates. In these situations, trophy anglers fished in greater numbers 634 
than consumptive anglers, because they were less concerned with harvest constraints 635 
and more interested in attributes of the fishery unrelated to catch rates. Despite their 636 
greater numbers, at low MSL  levels the less consumptive nature and the reduced 637 
catch rates of trophy anglers (which occurred because they used gear that targeted fish 638 
of larger size) resulted in them imposing less fishing mortality on a fish stock than 639 
consumptive anglers. 640 
This demonstrates that both aspects of angler heterogeneity, diversity in 641 
angling preferences and differences in fishing practices, are important when 642 
determining optimal angling regulations. Furthermore, while managing for angler 643 
diversity to enhance the recreational fishing experience of all anglers has been 644 
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repeatedly called for (Driver et al. 1984; Aas et al. 2000; Arlinghaus and Mehner 645 
2004a), our study is the first to explicitly demonstrate the benefits of such an 646 
approach when determining optimal, angler-type-specific regulations to maximize 647 
social welfare. 648 
Although the aim of our modelling exercise was to explore the general 649 
importance of behavioural complexity and diversity in anglers, our model-based 650 
results also highlight some practical implications. In particular, our model findings 651 
suggest that some MSL  regulations currently used for pike fisheries (45-75 cm in 652 
North America; Paukert et al. 2001) are below the optimal levels (53-99 cm) predicted 653 
by our model for the different angler types. Implementation of lower-than-optimal 654 
minimum size limits could put fish populations at risk of recruitment overfishing. 655 
Thus, depending on the composition of the local angler population, special regulations 656 
described by Paukert et al. (2001) that are geared toward particular angler types (e.g., 657 
maximum-size limits, inverse slot length limits) may perform better than the standard 658 
solution of imposing a moderately low minimum-size limit (such as 45-50 cm). 659 
Despite considerable differences among angler types, we found that socially 660 
optimal regulations resulted in biologically sustainable exploitation patterns. This is 661 
because angler utility is partly dependent on catch-related attributes of the fishery 662 
(such as catch rates or fish size), which implicitly requires a productive, biologically 663 
sustainable fishery in the long term. Our results therefore indicate that socioeconomic 664 
management objectives, such as maximizing social welfare, can account for the state 665 
of a fish population through its influence on angler utility and thus provide 666 
management advice that results in biologically sustainable exploitation. This supports 667 
suggestions for a focus on optimal social yield (OSY) when managing for 668 
sustainability (Roedel 1975; Malvestuto and Hudgins 1996; Carpenter and Brock 669 
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2004). However, the occurrence of optimal regulations in the vicinity of SPR  levels 670 
suggestive of recruitment overfishing varied with angler type. Thus, a precautionary 671 
approach has to be taken in socially optimal management, to account for the 672 
stochastic processes underlying any fishery.  673 
Angler–population composition 674 
The results discussed so far account for the dynamics and heterogeneity in 675 
angler behaviour, they are still limited, in the sense that the angler population was 676 
assumed to be composed of just one angler type. In reality, angler populations are 677 
composed of different types of anglers that vary in their preferences and behaviour 678 
(Hahn 1991; Fisher 1997; Connelly et al. 2001). Our study has shown that this 679 
composition affects optimal regulations. Moreover, while, managers might be 680 
inclined, for the sake of simplicity, to represent angler populations in terms of an 681 
average angler (Hahn 1991; Aas and Ditton 1998), we found that such a simplification 682 
can lead to misleading predictions of optimal regulations and biological impacts. This 683 
is because different angler types dominated the realized angling effort under different 684 
regulations, and because optimal regulations were consistently more restrictive for the 685 
mixed angler populations than for the average populations. Shifts in the angling 686 
population was also important for determining biological impacts, because of 687 
differences in fishing practices and participation of the different angler types. 688 
Therefore, our model results underscore the importance of considering not 689 
only dynamic angler behaviour and angler heterogeneity in both angling preferences 690 
and angling practices in models of recreational-fisheries management (Post et al. 691 
2008) , but also how dynamics and diversity interact in angler populations containing 692 
a mixture of angler types. Our findings suggest that current monitoring methods that 693 
pool information about anglers need to be modified to account for the heterogeneity 694 
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of angler types using specific fisheries. This will allow managers to understand better 695 
which types of anglers are fishing and why (Radomski et al. 2001), thus yielding 696 
insights that our model results suggest could be of crucial importance for determining 697 
optimal regulations and for more accurately predicting the biological impacts of the 698 
angling population. 699 
Social-welfare measures 700 
A final insight from this study relates to the importance of the management 701 
objectives determining optimal input and output regulations. From a welfare-702 
economics perspective, the management objective is to maximize the social welfare a 703 
fishery provides to the angling community irrespective of which anglers benefit the 704 
most or the least (Cole and Ward 1994; Perman et al. 2003). However, our results 705 
suggest, that a strictly utilitarian economic approach may alienate some angling 706 
groups from a fishery that is managed for maximum total utility. For example, we 707 
found that consumptive anglers interested in fish harvest were no longer attracted to a 708 
fishery that was subject to restrictive maximum-size limits. Trophy anglers, in 709 
contrast, enjoyed high individual utility at high MSL  levels, mainly because of their 710 
lack of consumptive orientation and the greater importance of fishing to their lifestyle. 711 
As a result, trophy anglers gained more utility, which strongly influenced the TU 712 
social-welfare measure, and thus optimal regulations. Social-welfare measures that 713 
reflected more equitable management objectives, such as equitable utilitarian utility 714 
(EU) or Rawlsian utility (RU), rendered optimal regulations in mixed angler 715 
populations more restrictive, but resulted in a more diverse composition of anglers 716 
attracted to a fishery. 717 
Thus, although there is no universal consensus about which social-welfare 718 
functions to use to quantify welfare (Cole and Ward 1994; Perman et al. 2003), our 719 
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results illustrate how the optimal regulations predicted by bioeconomic models are 720 
sensitive to the social-welfare measures applied. Therefore, managers need to be 721 
explicit about their underlying management goals and objectives (Barber and Taylor 722 
1990; Aas and Ditton 1998), and ensure that the welfare measure applied closely 723 
reflects these objectives, when implementing an OSY approach to recreational-724 
fisheries management.  725 
Limitations and extensions 726 
While we hope that our study provides valuable insights about the importance 727 
of angler dynamics and angler heterogeneity when managing for OSY, several 728 
limitations need to be highlighted. First, our model results depend on the description 729 
of angler behaviour. Application of our modelling approach to local fisheries 730 
therefore requires a quantitative assessment of the local and regional angler 731 
populations, e.g., using stated and revealed choice models (Hunt 2005; Massey et al. 732 
2006). A second limitation is that we assumed that over time, anglers will follow the 733 
same behavioural patterns and will keep occurring in the same proportions, which 734 
may be in error (Baerenklau and Provencher 2005). Temporal trends in the behavior 735 
of individual anglers or in the composition of the angler population could be 736 
examined in future extensions of our model. Changing preferences of anglers over 737 
time due to specialization or learning, could also be exciting to investigate, as angler 738 
will likely adapt to changes in the fishery by altering their expectations (Arlinghaus 739 
2006a). Third, to simplify an already complex, model we assumed that participation 740 
decisions were made on an annual basis, whereas other time steps may be more 741 
realistic (Schuhmann and Schwabe 2004; Hunt 2005). However, because we were 742 
interested in long-term equilibrium conditions, our simplifying assumption seems 743 
warranted. Fourth, our model described a single fishery and therefore did not account 744 
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for changes in utility offered by substitute sites in the vicinity of the modeled fishery. 745 
Clearly, this is an unrealistic assumption, and further research is needed to broaden 746 
our modelling approach to fisheries landscapes (Lester et al. 2003).  747 
A final limitation of this study is that we defined social welfare in terms of 748 
aggregated utility, rather than aggregated willingness-to-pay. In environmental and 749 
resource economics, including recreational-fisheries economics, an aggregate of 750 
individuals’ willingness-to-pay for an environmental good or service is a commonly 751 
used welfare measure (Edwards 1991). In empirical studies of non-marketable goods 752 
and services, such as recreational fisheries, this measure of social welfare is calculated 753 
using the change in utility provided by attributes of the good (such as catch rate or 754 
crowding) from one condition of the fishery to another divided by the marginal utility 755 
of income (such as the license cost coefficient in our model) and is expressed in 756 
monetary units (Hanemann 1984). Here, we chose not to express utility in monetary 757 
units, because this would necessitate making an additional assumption about the 758 
baseline condition used for comparison, and because it was felt to be imprudent to put 759 
a monetary value on hypothetical scenarios. However, such calculation could be 760 
carried out if appropriate empirically derived parameters were available from stated- 761 
or revealed-preference models for angler-type-specific part-worth-utility functions 762 
(e.g., Massey et al. 2006). This would also ensure that the welfare measure has a 763 
cardinal scale avoiding the potential debate of how comparable utility is among 764 
individuals (Perman et al. 2003). 765 
Despite these limitations, by coupling socioeconomic and biological models 766 
our modelling framework is among the few that addresses the often-touted need for an 767 
interdisciplinary approach to recreational-fisheries management (e.g., Anderson 1993) 768 
(Johnson and Carpenter 1994; Radomski et al. 2001), and provides a basis for future 769 
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research. There are numerous directions in which our model can be extended, 770 
including incorporating environmental stochasticity and a multi-species biology. 771 
These extensions are important because deterministic models (Carpenter et al. 1994) 772 
and single-species models (Worm et al. 2009) may result in erroneous conclusions 773 
about appropriate management strategies. In multi-species models, incorporating 774 
angling preferences for different species and indirect effects of angling on the aquatic 775 
food webs (Roth et al. 2007) are promising options for complementing the predictions 776 
presented here. 777 
Further avenues for future research include, exploring the part-worth-utility 778 
functions driving angler behaviour, examining the sensitivity of model predictions to 779 
changes in fishery attributes, and investigating an even larger numbers of prototypical 780 
angler types and their interactions in mixed angling populations Because multi-lake 781 
fisheries opportunities (Parkinson et al. 2004; Post et al. 2008) are more realistic than 782 
the simplified single-lake perspective have adopted here, exploration of angler choice 783 
within a landscape of fishing opportunities (Carpenter and Brock 2004) may be the 784 
most important extension of our modelling approach. 785 
Implications 786 
Even though we have just scratched the surface, we hope that readers share 787 
our optimism that the interdisciplinary approach to modeling recreational fisheries 788 
introduced here constitutes a sound and extensible theoretical framework. The 789 
approach builds on choice theory from welfare economics, angler-specialization 790 
theory from leisure sciences and traditional ecological theory, and provides unique 791 
insights into recreational-fisheries management.  792 
A key finding of this study and related work (Carpenter and Brock 2004) is 793 
that “one-size-fits-all” policies are likely to produce suboptimal management 794 
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outcomes, because they cannot account for the diversity and complexity of angler 795 
behaviour that is inherent to most of the world’s recreational fisheries (Cox et al. 796 
2003; Arlinghaus et al. 2008a; Post et al. 2008). Furthermore, we have shown that 797 
misleading predictions about optimal management can result from the omission of 798 
dynamic angler behaviour and angler heterogeneity from recreational-fisheries 799 
models; this can put fish populations at risk of overfishing, in line with what has been 800 
suggested by other studies (Carpenter et al. 1994; Parkinson et al. 2004). In contrast, 801 
although managers need to be aware that socially optimal regulations strongly depend 802 
on the applied measure of social welfare and the management objectives upon which 803 
it is based, managing for socially optimal regulations resulted in both social and 804 
biological sustainability. 805 
Managers are likely to encounter difficulties in jointly satisfying the interests 806 
of the entire angling public. Decisions therefore need to be made about how to best 807 
distribute access to scarce resources across angler types (Loomis and Ditton 1993; 808 
Daigle et al. 1996). The benefit of an interdisciplinary bioeconomic modelling 809 
approach, such as the one presented here, is that it enables managers to quantify 810 
welfare changes resulting from alternative management scenarios, and to predict how 811 
these regulations will affect different segments of the angling public, as well as the 812 
fish population. A decision-support tool such as this one, built on clear objectives and 813 
quantitative descriptions, thereby fostering transparency and defensibility in the 814 
management process, can facilitate decision taking and clarify when managing for 815 
diverse angling opportunities is the best strategy. Ideally, accounting for angler 816 
dynamics and angler diversity in fisheries-management models will provide more 817 
accurate and realistic predictions of optimal regulations that maximize angler 818 
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satisfaction, minimize conflicts among angling groups and result in the sustainable 819 
management of recreational fisheries. 820 
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Table 1  Model equations. The modelled species was pike (Esox lucius L.). Variables, 1131 
parameters, parameter values and their sources are listed in Tables 2. Angler types are 1132 
specified in Table 3. 1133 
Number Equation Description 
 Individual-angler utility  
1a 
f cj jU U=  Conditional indirect utility gained by an 
angler of type j  from choosing to fish in the 
catch-based scenario only 
1b 
f 0 c s x
a r o        
j j j j j
j j j
U U U U U
U U U
= + + ++ + +  Conditional indirect utility gained by an angler of type j  from choosing to fish in the 
static and multi-attribute scenarios 
 Angler-effort dynamics  
2a 
f
f
n f
ˆexp( )
ˆexp( ) exp( )
j
j
j
U
p
U U
= +  Probability that an angler of type j  chooses 
to fish, over the alternative to not fish, where 
f
ˆ( )jU  applies to the previous year 
2b 
F f F
ˆ(1 )j j jp p pϕ ϕ= − +  Realized probability that an angler of type j  
chooses to fish, where Fˆ jp  applies to the 
previous year 
2c 
F maxj jD p D=  Number of days an angler of type j  chooses 
to fish during a year 
2d 
L Lj jA A ρ=  Number of licensed anglers of type j  
2e 
L /j j jE D A φ= Ψ  Total annual realized fishing effort per unit 
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area of all anglers of type j  
2f 
F F
F
/ if  
 
0 if  
j
jt
E S t S
e
t S
≤⎧= ⎨ >⎩  Instantaneous fishing effort per unit area at time t  of all anglers of type j  
 Age-structured fish population  
3a max
total
0
a
a
a
N N==∑  Total fish population density 
3b max
total
0
a
a a
a
B N W==∑  Total fish biomass density 
 Growth  
4a max
total 1/21 /
= + hh B B  Maximum annual growth of a fish dependent 
on the biomass density at the beginning of the 
year 
4b 
0 m
m
1 (1 / ) if  1
3
1 if  1
⎧ − + ≥ −⎪= +⎨⎪ < −⎩ aa
G L h a a
p G
a a
 
Proportion of the growing season during 
which a fish of age a  allocates energy to 
growth 
4c 
G G
G
/ if  
0 if  
≤⎧= ⎨ >⎩ aat ah S t p Sg t p S  Instantaneous growth rate in length of a fish of age a  at time t  
4d 
0= +at a atL L g t  Length of a fish of age a  at time t  
4e l
at atW wL=  Mass of a fish of age a  at time t  
 Reproduction  
5a 
e m
m
/ if  
0 if  
a
a
W GSI W a  a
R
a  a
δ ≥⎧= ⎨ <⎩  Annual fecundity of a female fish of age a  
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5b max
m== Φ∑a a aa ab R N  Annual population fecundity density, pulsed at the beginning of the year 
5c 
0
1/21 /
= +s b bα  Survival probability from spawning to post-
hatch of fish of age zero, applied at the 
beginning of the year 
5d 
0 0=N s b  Density of age zero fish at the beginning of 
the year 
6 
F U/SPR b b=  Spawning potential ratio (= relative reduction 
in egg production under fishing relative to the 
corresponding unfished condition) 
 Mortality  
7a [1 exp( )] j
z
ajt j atv y L= − −  Proportion of fish of age a  that are 
vulnerable to capture by anglers of type j  at 
time t  
7b =ajt j jt ajtc q e v  Instantaneous per capita catch rate of fish of 
age a  by anglers of type j  at time t  
7c 
n
1 if  
if  
at
ajt
j at
L MSL
H f L MSL
≥⎧= ⎨ <⎩  Proportion of fish at age a  that are harvestable by anglers of type j  at time t  
7d max
0==∑ajt ajt a ajtaC c N H  Instantaneous catch rate of harvestable fish by 
anglers of type j  at time t  
7e 
H maxmin( , / )jt jt j jtC C c e= Ψ  Instantaneous harvest rate by anglers of type 
j  at time t  
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7f H H
H h
jt jt jt
jt j
jt jt
C C Cf f
C C
−= +  Proportion of vulnerable harvestable fish 
killed by anglers of type j  at time t  
7g 
f H h (1 )ajt jt ajt ajt j ajt ajtm f c H f c H= + −  Instantaneous per capita fishing mortality rate 
of fish of age a  imposed by anglers of type j  
at time t  
7h 
n f= +∑at a ajt
j
d m m  Instantaneous per capita mortality rate of fish 
of age a  at time t  
7i 
a
at a
dN d N
dt
= −  
 
Continuous rate of change in the density of 
fish of age a  at time t  
 Social-welfare measures  
8a 
TU f Lj j j
j
U U D A=∑  Annual total utility 
8b 
EU f L( ) ( )=∑ ∑j j j j
j j
U U D Aρ  Annual equitable utilitarian utility 
8c 
RU f Lmin( ) ( )j j jj j
U U D A= ∑  Annual Rawlsian utility 
 1134 
1135 
 51
Table 2  Model variables, parameters, parameter values and their sources. The modeled 1136 
species was pike (Esox lucius L.). Equations are listed in Table 1. Angler types are 1137 
specified in Table 3. 1138 
Symbol Description (unit, where applicable) Equation Value or range Source
Index variables    
j  Angler type  Generic, consumptive, 
trophy, or average 
 
a  Age class (y)  0 - maxa   
maxa  Maximum age of a fish (y)  15  (1) 
t  Time within the year (y)  0 - 1  
Angling regulations    
MSL  Minimum-size limit (cm) 7c 0 - 120  
LA  Number of angling licenses (= 
number of licensed anglers) 
2d 0 - 100  
Angler population    
jρ  Proportion of the angler population 
that is composed of anglers of type 
j  
2d, 8b Non-mixed: 1.0 for one 
j ; 0.0 for the others 
Mixed: (0.4, 0.3, 0.3, 0.0)
 
Angler-effort dynamics    
nU  Conditional indirect utility gained by 
an angler from choosing not to fish  
2a 0  
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ϕ  Persistence of fishing behaviour (= 
the relative influence of last year’s 
realized fishing probability on the 
current year’s realized fishing 
probability) 
2b 0.5  
Ψ  Average time an angler will fish in a 
day (h) 
2e 4 * 
maxD  Maximum number of days that an 
angler would fish per year 
irrespective of fishing quality 
2c 40 *
φ  Lake area (ha) 2e 
 
100  
FS  Annual duration of the fishing 
season (y) 
2f 9/12  
Age-structured fish population    
aN  Density of fish of age a  (ha
-1
) 3a, 3b, 5b, 
5d, 7d 
0 - ∞  
Growth    
maxh  Maximum growth increment (cm) 4a 24.0 †
1/2B  Total fish biomass density at which 
the growth increment if halved (kg
-1
 
ha) 
4a 100.0 †
G  Annual reproductive investment 4b 0.58 †
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ma  Age at first spawning (y) 4b, 5a 2 (4)  
0aL  Length of fish of age a  at the 
beginning of a year (cm) 
4b   
0L  Length of fish at hatch (cm) 4b 0.8 (2) 
GS  Annual duration of the growing 
season (y) 
4c 1.0  
w  Scaling constant for length-mass 
relationship (gcm
-l
) 
4e 0.0048 (6) 
l  Allometric parameter for length-
mass relationship 
4e 3.059 (6) 
Reproduction    
GSI  Gonadosomatic index 
(= gonadic mass/somatic mass) 
5a 0.17 (3) 
eW  Average egg mass (g) 5a 0.0050 (3) 
δ  Proportion of eggs that hatch 5a 0.75 (4) 
Φ  Proportion of female fish in the 
spawning population 
5b 0.5 (5) 
α  Maximum proportion of offspring 
surviving from spawning to post-
hatch
 
5c 4.7510
-4
 ‡
1/2b  Annual population fecundity density 
at which survival of offspring from 
5c 20,325 
 
‡
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spawning to post-hatch is halved 
(ha) 
Fb  Annual population fecundity under 
fishing 
6 0 - ∞  
Ub  Annual population fecundity under 
unfished conditions 
6 0 - ∞  
Mortality    
nam  Instantaneous natural mortality rate 
of fish of age a  (y
-1
) 
7h 0.00 if  0
0.42 if  0
a
a
=>  (4) 
Sources: (1) Craig and Kipling 1983; (2) Frost and Kipling 1967; (3) Hubenova et al. 1139 
2007; (4) Kipling and Frost 1970; (5) Le Cren et al. 1977; (6) Willis 1989. 1140 
* Estimated from average participation rates and average lengths of fishing trips obtained 1141 
from diary data of recreational anglers in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany (Dorow 1142 
and Arlinghaus, unpublished data) and other literature (van Poorten and Post 2005; Post 1143 
et al. 2008). 1144 
† Estimated from empirical length-at-age and biomass density data from various pike 1145 
studies (Kipling and Frost 1970; Kipling 1983a; Tresurer et al. 1992; Pierce et al. 2003; 1146 
Pierce and Tomcko 2003; Pierce and Tomcko 2005) by minimizing the sum of squares 1147 
using the ‘solver’ function in Excel (Microsoft
®
 Office Excel 2003).   1148 
‡ Estimated from modified data on female biomass and age-2 abundance in Lake 1149 
Windermere (Kipling 1983b). Egg density was determined using the relative fecundity 1150 
relationship reported in (Craig and Kipling 1983) and adult biomass (Kipling 1983b), and 1151 
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natural mortality information from Kipling and Frost (1970) was used to calculate age-1 1152 
abundance from age 2 abundance. 1153 
 56
Table 3  Angler types and their angling behavior. Parameters describe four angler types (generic, consumptive, trophy, and average) in 1154 
terms of the basic utility they gain from fishing, their tolerances with regard to managerial constraints, their preferences with regard to 1155 
attributes of the fishing experience, and their fishing practices. Parameter values for the average angler type are weighted averages of 1156 
the corresponding parameter values for the three prototypical angler types, weighted by the proportion of each angler type in the 1157 
angler population (0.4 generic; 0.3 consumptive; 0.3 trophy). Parameters values for the angler-type-specific part-worth-utility (PWU) 1158 
functions (Figure 3) were chosen based on assumptions about differences among angler types reported in the angler-specialization 1159 
literature. Figure 1 illustrates qualitative differences in angler preferences, and Figure 3 illustrates the angler-type-specific utility 1160 
functions based on the parameters listed here. 1161 
Variable Symbol and defining equation 
(affected equation); rationale 
for general shape (source) 
Rationale for angler-type-specific 
shape (source) 
Parameters values describing angler types 
Generic Consumptive Trophy Average 
Importance of fishing to angler lifestyle      
Basic utility 
gained by an 
angler of type 
0 jU  (equation 1b); 
Constant function: the 
propensity to fish when all 
As specialization increases: basic 
utility of fishing increases (4, 16); 
the assumed annual participation 
Lowest 
0 0.405jU = −  
(40% 
Intermediate 
0 0.000jU =  
(50% 
Highest 
0 0.405jU =  
(60% 
 
0 0.041jU = −  
(49% 
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j  from 
choosing to fish 
other attributes are as expected; 
see **†‡ for expected values.  
is generally consistent with study 
findings (7, 10). 
probability of 
fishing) 
probability of 
fishing) 
probability of 
fishing) 
probability of 
fishing) 
Tolerances with regard to managerial constraints      
PWU of 
minimum-size 
limit for an 
angler of type 
j  
2
r 1 2 3j j j jU u r u r u= + +  
(equation 1b), where r  is the 
standardized MSL *; 
Dome-shaped quadratic 
function: anglers may prefer 
moderate minimum-size 
regulations, but object to too 
low and to too high levels (10, 
16, 17). 
As specialization increases: 
anglers become less consumptive 
and have a greater acceptance of 
stricter minimum-size regulations 
(6, 16), but consumptively 
oriented anglers are averse to 
harvest regulations that limit their 
ability to harvest fish (1, 8, 12). 
Intermediate 
1 2.321ju =  
2 3.869ju = −  
3 0.271ju =  
Lowest 
1 3.766ju =  
2 9.414ju = −  
3 0.471ju =  
Highest 
1 2.534ju =  
2 2.534ju = −  
3 0.228ju = −  
 
1 2.819ju =  
2 5.132ju = −  
3 0.181ju =  
PWU of annual 
license cost for 
an angler of 
o 4j jU u o=  (equation 1b), 
where o is the relative license 
cost**; 
As specialization increases: cost 
aversion decreases (4, 16). 
 
Lowest 
4 0.015ju = −  
€
-1
 
Intermediate 
4 0.011ju = −  
€
-1
 
Highest 
4 0.008ju = −  
€
-1
 
 
4 0.012ju = −  
€
-1
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type j  Linear function: license costs 
usually have a negative effect on 
angler utility (14, 21). 
Preferences with regard to attributes of the fishing experience     
PWU of daily 
catch rate for an 
angler of type 
j  
2
c 5 D 6 Dj j jU u c u c= +  
(equations 1a and 1b), where 
Dc  is the relative daily catch 
rate†; 
Dome-shaped quadratic 
function: greater utility is 
gained from increasing catch 
rates (2, 3, 15), but marginal 
benefits decrease at high catch 
rates due to the lack of 
challenge (1, 2, 9). 
As specialization increases: focus 
shifts from quantity to quality and 
to the challenge of the catch (2, 6, 
15). 
Intermediate 
interest in 
catch 
 
Lowest 
interest in 
challenge 
 
5 0.968ju =  
6 0.121ju = −  
Highest 
interest in 
catch 
 
Intermediate 
interest in 
challenge 
 
5 1.318ju =  
6 0.220ju = −  
Lowest 
interest in 
catch 
 
Highest 
interest in 
challenge 
 
5 0.825ju =  
6 0.206ju = −  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 1.030ju =  
6 0.176ju = −  
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PWU of 
average size of 
fish captured 
annually for an 
angler of type 
j  
s 7 8j j jU u l u= +  (equation 1b), 
where l  is the relative size of 
fish caught†; 
Linear function: anglers have a 
general preference for catching 
larger fish (2, 10, 11). 
As specialization increases: 
importance attached to the size of 
fish increases (2, 6, 10). 
 
Lowest 
7 2.476ju =  
8 0.000ju =  
Intermediate 
7 3.389ju =  
8 0.000ju =  
Highest 
7 4.394ju =  
8 0.220ju = −  
 
7 3.326ju =  
8 0.066ju = −  
PWU of 
maximum size of 
fish captured 
annually for an 
angler of type j  
2
9 x x
x 2
9 x x
if  0
if  0
j
j
j
u l l
U
u l l
⎧ ≥⎪= ⎨− <⎪⎩  
(equation 1b), where xl  is the 
relative maximum size (= the 
95
th
 percentile in the size 
distribution of fish caught†); 
Piecewise quadratic function: 
increasing when the relative 
maximum size† is positive and 
As specialization increases: utility 
gained from large-sized fish 
increases (2, 6, 17), but the least 
specialized, generic anglers gain 
more utility than consumptive 
anglers in the unlikely event that 
they catch a large fish (8). 
Intermediate 
9 9.414ju =  
Lowest 
9 6.878ju =  
Highest 
9 12.207ju =  
 
9 9.491ju =  
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decreasing when it is negative; 
anglers gain greater utility from 
larger fish (18), and the relative 
value of large-sized fish is 
nonlinear (12). 
PWU of 
crowding for an 
angler of type 
j  
2
a 10 11 12j j j jU u A u A u= + +  
(equation 1b), where A  is the 
expected daily congestion ‡; 
Dome-shaped quadratic 
function: anglers gain utility 
from the social aspects of 
fishing, but avoid congested 
sites (22). 
As specialization increases: desire 
for solitude increases (6, 7, 22); 
consumptive anglers recognize 
that areas with high catch rates 
will attract other anglers (13). 
Highest 
10 0.244ju =  
11 0.031ju = −  
12 0.610ju =  
Intermediate 
10 0.149ju =  
11 0.025ju = −  
12 0.396ju =  
Lowest 
10 0.136ju =  
11 0.034ju = −  
12 0.712ju =  
 
10 0.183ju =  
11 0.030ju = −  
12 0.577ju =  
Fishing practices      
Skill level of an jq  (equation 7b); As specialization increases: skill Lowest Intermediate Highest  
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angler of type 
j  
Measured in terms of 
catchability. 
level increases (8, 10). 0.011jq =  
hah
-1
 
0.020jq =  
hah
-1
 
0.025jq =  
hah
-1
 
0.018jq =  
hah
-1
 
Size selectivity 
for an angler of 
type j  
jy  and jz  (equation 7a) 
Measured in terms of 
parameters for the size-
dependent vulnerability to 
capture (modified from 20). 
As specialization increases: type 
of fishing gear used changes (2, 
6), and gear used by more 
specialized anglers catches larger 
fish (21). 
Small 
0.21jy =   
cm
-1
 
406jz =  
Small 
0.21jy =   
cm
-1
 
406jz =  
Large 
0.21jy =   
cm
-1
 
4636jz =  
 
0.21jy =   
cm
-1
 
1675jz =  
Threshold for 
practicing 
voluntarily 
catch-and-
release fish for 
an angler of 
type j  
max jc  (equation 7e) 
Measured in terms of the 
desired average number of fish 
an angler will harvest daily. 
As specialization increases: 
propensity to harvest fish 
decreases (6). 
Highest 
max 2jc =  
Lowest 
max jc = ∞  
Intermediate 
max 0.5jc =  
 
max jc = ∞  
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Hooking 
mortality for an 
angler of type 
j  
hjf  (equations 7f and 7g) 
Measured in terms of the 
proportion of fish dying from 
hooking mortality. 
As specialization increases: no 
differences in hooking mortality 
levels (5) were assumed. 
 
h 0.05jf =  
 
h 0.05jf =  
 
h 0.05jf =  
 
h 0.05jf =  
Non-
compliance 
mortality for an 
angler of type 
j  
njf  (equation 7c) 
Measured in terms of the 
proportion of fish under the 
minimum-size limit ( MSL ) 
that are harvested illegally. 
As specialization increases: no 
differences in non-compliance 
were assumed; because values 
reported in the literature vary 
widely (19, 23, 24), a 
conservative constant value of 5% 
was assumed. 
 
n 0.05jf =  
 
n 0.05jf =  
 
n 0.05jf =  
 
n 0.05jf =  
Sources: (1) Aas and Kaltenborn 1995; (2) Aas et al. 2000; (3) Arlinghaus 2006b; (4) Arlinghaus and Mehner 2004b; (5) Arlinghaus et 1162 
al. 2008c; (6) Bryan 1977; (7) Connelly et al. 2001; (8) Dorow et al. 2010; (9) Fedler and Ditton 1994; (10) Fisher 1997; (11) Gillis 1163 
and Ditton 2002; (12) Jacobson 1996; (13) Martinson and Shelby 1992; (14) Massey et al. 2006; (15) Oh and Ditton 2006; (16) Oh et 1164 
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al. 2005a; (17) Oh et al. 2005b; (18) Paulrud and Laitila 2004; (19) Pierce and Tomcko 1998; (20) Post et al. 2003; (21) Rapp et al. 1165 
2008; (22) Schuhmann and Schwabe 2004; (23) Sullivan 2002; (24) Walker et al. 2007. 1166 
* max/r MSL L=  is the relative minimum-size limit, standardized to range between 0 and 1, where maxL  is the maximum size that a 1167 
fish can attain at the maximum age allowed in the absence of density dependence (equations 4a-d). 1168 
** o e( )o O O= −  is the annual fishing-license cost relative to a baseline expected value, where oO  and eO  are the observed and 1169 
expected values, respectively. 1170 
† Attributes related to the fish population represent the proportional difference scaled relative to a baseline expected value as follows: 1171 
D Do De/ 1c C C= − , where DoC  and DeC , respectively, are the observed and expected average daily catch rates; o e/ 1l L L= − , where 1172 
oL  and eL , respectively, are the observed and expected average sizes of caught fish in a year; x x o x e/ 1l L L= − , where x oL  and x eL , 1173 
respectively, are the observed and expected the maximum sizes of caught fish in a year (with the latter defined as the 95
th
 percentile of 1174 
the size distribution of caught fish). Expected values are based on the literature and on unpublished data from pike fisheries. We 1175 
assumed an expected daily catch rate of 0.5 fish (Kempinger and Carline 1978; Goeman et al. 1993; Arlinghaus et al. 2008c) and that 1176 
anglers fished 4 h in an angling day, an expected average size of 51 cm (Kempinger and Carline 1978; Pierce et al. 1995 (harvested 1177 
fish); Arlinghaus et al. 2008c), and an expected average maximum size of 69 cm (Dorow and Arlinghaus, unpublished data). 1178 
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‡ L F( ) / (365 )=∑ j j
j
A D A S  is the expected average number of anglers fishing in a day (see equations 2c-d). 1179 
  1180 
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Table 4  Predicted optimal regulation and their implications. Optimal input and output 1181 
regulations maximized social welfare for various angler types and for different 1182 
assumptions about angler behaviour and social-welfare measures. Implications are 1183 
shown in terms of resulting angling efforts and biological impacts (with the latter 1184 
being measured by the spawning-potential ratio SPR ). Three social-welfare measures 1185 
were examined for the mixed angler population: total utility (TU), an equitable 1186 
utilitarian utility (EU) and a Rawlsian utility (RU) ( Table 1, equations 8 a-c). For the 1187 
non-mixed angler populations, results for the EU and R were identical to those for TU 1188 
and are therefore not repeated.  1189 
Scenario Angler population 
Generic Consumptive Trophy Average Mixed 
Optimal minimum-size limit (cm)    
Static – TU 80 53 99 69 69 
Catch-based – TU 104 102 101 106 98 
Multi-attribute – TU 
(EU; RU) 
80 53 99 69 93 
(69; 63) 
Optimal angler-license number    
Static – TU 38 27 36 31 36 
Catch-based – TU 92 100 99 100 100 
Multi-attribute – TU 
(EU; RU) 
52 36 39 44 66 
(48; 48) 
Annual realized angling effort under optimal regulations (hha-1)  
Static – TU 61 43 58 50 58 
Catch-based – TU 80 112 93 94 97 
Multi-attribute – TU 61 43 58 50 65 
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(EU; RU) (57; 57) 
Composition of anglers fishing in the mixed angler population under optimal regulations 
Static – TU 0.40 0.30 0.30 n.a n.a 
Catch-based – TU 0.34 0.37 0.29 n.a n.a 
Multi-attribute – TU 
(EU; RU) 
0.41 
(0.38; 0.37) 
0.14 
(0.27; 0.29) 
0.45 
(0.35; 0.34) 
n.a n.a 
Spawning-potential ratio under optimal regulations  
Static – TU 0.74 0.38 0.73 0.61 0.57 
Catch-based – TU 0.78 0.54 0.61 0.67 0.63 
Multi-attribute – TU 
(EU; RU) 
0.74 0.39 0.73 0.61 0.73 
(0.57; 0.48) 
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Figure captions 1192 
Figure 1  Simplified flow diagram illustrating interactions among the three model 1193 
components of our bioeconomic modelling approach: the biological component, the 1194 
socioeconomic component, and the management component. The model included 1195 
three angler-behavior scenarios: (a) static angler behavior, where anglers fish at the 1196 
maximal rate; (b) catch-based dynamic angler behavior, where anglers responded to 1197 
the fishery based on catch rates; (c) multi-attribute dynamic angler behavior, where 1198 
anglers responded to the fishery based on a multi-attribute utility function. Black, 1199 
solid arrows depict influences that apply across all scenarios, while gray arrows apply 1200 
to the catch-based scenario only and black dashed arrows apply to either the static or 1201 
multi-attribute scenarios as is also indicated by labels along the arrows. Factors in 1202 
round-cornered boxes dynamically change throughout model runs, while parameters 1203 
for factors in square-cornered boxes were held constant. 1204 
 1205 
Figure 2  Qualitative differences in angler preferences for fishery attributes among 1206 
the three different prototypical angler types (generic, consumptive, and trophy 1207 
anglers). Gray circles indicate the relative preference levels or tolerance levels (low, 1208 
intermediate, or high) of angler types for a particular fishery attribute. 1209 
 1210 
Figure 3  Part-worth-utility functions describing the preferences of generic, 1211 
consumptive, trophy and average anglers for various attributes of the fishery. 1212 
 1213 
Figure 4  Total utility (TU) over a range of input (license number) and output 1214 
(minimum-size limit) regulations. Columns illustrate results for three angler-1215 
behaviour scenarios (left column: static angler behaviour, where anglers fished at the 1216 
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maximal rate; middle column: catch-based dynamic angler behaviour, where anglers 1217 
responded to the fishery based on catch rates; right column: multi-attribute dynamic 1218 
angler behaviour, where anglers responded to the fishery based on a multi-attribute 1219 
utility function). Rows illustrate results for five different angler populations (first row: 1220 
generic anglers; second row: consumptive anglers; third row: trophy anglers; fourth 1221 
row: average anglers; and fifth row: mixed angler population composed of 40% 1222 
generic, 30% consumptive, and 30% trophy anglers). Blue diamonds indicate the 1223 
optimum regulations at which total utility was maximized. 1224 
 1225 
Figure 5  Spawning-potential ratio ( SPR ) of fished populations over a range of input 1226 
(license number) and output (minimum-size limit) regulations. SPR  values below 1227 
0.35-0.4 indicate a potential for recruitment overfishing. Columns show results for 1228 
three angler-behavior scenarios (left column: static angler behaviour, where anglers 1229 
fished at the maximal rate; middle column: catch-based dynamic behaviour, where 1230 
anglers responded to the fishery based on catch rates; right column: multi-attribute 1231 
dynamic behaviour, where anglers responded to the fishery based on a multi-attribute 1232 
utility function). Rows show results for five different angler populations (first row: 1233 
generic anglers; second row: consumptive anglers; third row: trophy anglers; fourth 1234 
row: average anglers; fifth row: mixed angler population composed of 40% generic, 1235 
30% consumptive, and 30% trophy type anglers). Blue diamonds indicate the 1236 
optimum regulations at which total utility was maximized.   1237 
 1238 
Figure 6  Proportion of the total realized angling effort contributed by each angler 1239 
type in a mixed angler population over a range of input (license number) and output 1240 
(minimum-size limit) regulations. The mixed angler population was composed of 1241 
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40% generic, 30% consumptive, and 30% trophy type anglers. Anglers responded to 1242 
the fishery based on a multi-attribute utility function; see (o) panels in Figures 4 and 1243 
5. Blue diamonds indicate the optimum regulations at which total utility was 1244 
maximized. 1245 
 1246 
Figure 7  Social-welfare measures in a mixed angler population with multi-attribute 1247 
dynamic angler behavior over a range of input (license number) and output 1248 
(minimum-size limit) regulations. The mixed angler population was composed of 1249 
40% generic, 30% consumptive, and 30% trophy anglers. Results are shown for three 1250 
social-welfare measures (total utility, TU;, egalitarian utilitarian utility, EU; Rawlsian 1251 
utility, RU; see Table 1, equations 8a-c). Blue diamonds indicate the optimum 1252 
regulations at which the social-welfare measures were maximized.1253 
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Appendix A  Sensitivity of predicted optimal regulations to fishery attributes 1274 
 1275 
Table A1 Sensitivity of predicted optimal regulations, and of the conditions that occur 1276 
under these regulations, to the removal of single fishery attributes from the multi-1277 
attribute utility function (Table 1, equation 1b). Results shown are for the multi-1278 
attribute scenario, assuming total utility (TU) as the maximized social-welfare 1279 
measure. Parentheses show changes relative to results for the multi-attribute scenario 1280 
with all fishery attributes being included (Table 4). 1281 
Removed attribute Angler population 
Generic Consumptive Trophy Average Mixed (TU) 
Optimal minimum-size limit (cm)    
Minimum-size limit 104 (+30.0%) 103 (+94.3%) 104 (+5.1%) 105 (+52.2%) 99 (+6.5%) 
Crowding 60 (–25.0%) 51 (–3.8%) 96 (–3.0%) 50 (–27.5%) 99 (+6.5%) 
Catch 51 (–36.3%) 23 (–56.6%) 100 (+1.0%) 52 (–24.6%) 93 (0.0%) 
Average size 55 (–31.3%) 53 (0.0%) 101 (+2.0%) 61 (–11.6%) 61 (–34.3%)
Maximum size 62 (–22.5%) 52 (–1.9%) 86 (+13.1%) 69 (0.0%) 69 (–25.8%)
Optimal angler-license number    
Minimum-size limit 49 (–5.8%) 50 (+38.9%) 41 (+5.1%) 45 (+2.3%) 53 (–19.7%)
Crowding 20 (–61.5%) 31 (–13.9%) 88 (+125.6%) 12 (–72.7%) 100 (+51.5%)
Catch 56 (+7.7%) 40 (+11.1%) 42 (+7.7%) 47 (+6.8%) 75 (+13.6%)
Average size 55 (+5.8%) 44 (+22.2%) 42 (+7.7%) 48 (+9.1%) 46 (–30.3%)
Maximum size 51 (–1.9%) 39 (+8.3%) 44 (+12.8%) 44 (0.0%) 50 (–24.2%)
Annual realized angling effort under optimal regulations (hha-1)  
Minimum-size limit 61 (0.0%) 67 (+55.8%) 60 (+3.4%) 61 (+22.0%) 68 (+4.6%) 
Crowding 19 (–68.9%) 33 (–23.3%) 114 (+96.6%) 13 (–74.0%) 70 (+7.7%) 
 78
Catch 63 (+3.3%) 44 (+2.3%) 59 (+1.7%) 49 (–2.0%) 64 (–1.5%) 
Average size 64 (+4.9%) 55 (+27.9%) 59 (+1.7%) 53 (+6.0%) 57 (–12.3%)
Maximum size 58 (–4.9%) 46 (+7.0%) 61 (+5.2%) 49 (–2.0%) 59 (–9.2%) 
Composition of anglers fishing in the mixed angling population under optimal regulations 
Minimum-size limit 0.35 (–14.6%) 0.31 (+121.1%) 0.34 (–24.9%) n.a. n.a. 
Crowding 0.31 (–23.8%) 0.09 (–38.7%) 0.60 (+34.1%) n.a. n.a. 
Catch 0.45 (+8.6%) 0.06 (–55.6%) 0.49 (+9.7%) n.a. n.a. 
Average size 0.38 (–7.2%) 0.30 (+111.2%) 0.32 (–28.6%) n.a. n.a. 
Maximum size 0.38 (–7.9%) 0.27 (+91.6%) 0.35 (–21.8%) n.a. n.a. 
Spawning-potential ratio under optimal regulations   
Minimum-size limit 0.83 (+11.7%) 0.68 (+77.0%) 0.73 (–0.6%) 0.76 (+25.7%) 0.72 (–1.2%)
Crowding 0.76 (+2.2%) 0.42 (+10.0%) 0.56 (–23.1%) 0.66 (+9.3%) 0.71 (–2.3%)
Catch 0.42 (–43.8%) 0.13 (–65.6%) 0.72 (–0.7%) 0.38 (–37.3%) 0.74 (+0.8%)
Average size 0.43 (–41.8%) 0.34 (–12.5%) 0.72 (–0.9%) 0.49 (–18.5%) 0.48 (–34.7%)
Maximum size 0.56 (–24.5%) 0.37 (–3.9%) 0.68 (–7.2%) 0.61 (+0.2%) 0.57 (–22.3%)
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